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Abstract
Agency theory suggests that with enhanced monitoring, companies are more likely to pay out
their free cash flow. Institutional investors may be great monitors given that they are
professional investors with specialized expertise in evaluating firm’s financial performance,
management quality and governance. This study investigates the impact of institutional
investors on dividend policy in South Africa, during the period from 2009 to 2018. Examining
the effect of institutions as a whole can obscure the important variation in the subset of
institutions, as they are not homogeneously incentivised to monitor firms.  As a result, this
paper segregates institutional investors into subcategories based on their monitoring abilities.
Through the employment of a panel data regression model, this study finds a positive but
statistically insignificant relation between institutional ownership and the dividend pay-out
ratio; the positive relation is stronger in monitoring institutions. This paper used firm-fixed
effect models to control for the possible endogeneity coming from unobserved firm-level, time-
invariant factors that determine both dividend policy and institutional ownership at the same
time. The results of this paper do not support models that predict that institutional investors
cause an increase in firm dividend pay-out ratio.
Even though it is possible that firms pay dividends to reduce agency conflicts, this study did
not find evidence that supports that the portion of shares held by institutional investors are
related to the dividend pay-out policy. Secondly, although it is likely that institutions are more
competent in monitoring management actions than individuals, there is no evidence to support
that they use dividends as their monitoring device. The results of this study therefore caution
those that invest in companies in South Africa and expect to receive more dividends by merely
confirming the presence of institutional investors in their potential investee company.
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1. Introduction
Institutional owners are one of the most crucial investor groups across the globe. In 2017,
institutions held over eighty percent of the large-cap S&P 500 index and seventy eight percent
of the U.S. broad-market Russell 3000 index, which is about $18 trillion and $21.7 trillion,
respectively (McGrath, 2017). The momentousness of institutions has resulted in the effect of
institutional investors on firm dividend policy being widely studied in developed countries
(see, Short et al, 2002; Grinstein & Michaely, 2005; Chang et al., 2016; Huang & Paul, 2017)
and in developing countries (see, Azzam et al., 2010; Jeon et al, 2011; Lahiri,2013; Firth et al.,
2016; Jacob & Lukose 2018).
Literature investigating the effect of institutional investors on dividend policy reported mixed
results around the world. Some studies found positive and significant relations between
institutional investors and dividend policies (see, Short et al., 2002; Firth et al., 2016; Chang et
al., 2016; Cao, 2017; Huang & Paul, 2017), while other studies found no evidence to support
positive relations between institutional ownership and dividend pay-out levels (see, Grinstein
& Michaely, 2005; Amidu & Abor, 2006; Azzam et al., 2010; Jacob & Lukose, 2018). Though
these studies focused on both developed and emerging markets, none of them focused on South
Africa, except for Abor and Fiador (2013).
South Africa is the most mature financial market in Africa, it is advanced in terms of its legal
and regulatory framework and by far has the largest amount of Assets under Management in
Africa (PwC Market Research Centre, 2020:19). In the study conducted by Abor and Fiador
(2013), institutional investors were not segregated into their subcategories, rather, they were
treated as one homogeneous group. Given that literature has established that examining the
effect of institutions as a whole, obscures the important variation in the subset of institutions,
this paper segregates institutional investors into monitoring and non-monitoring institutions
(Bushee, 1998; Chen et al., 2007). Segregating institutional investors is crucial as it allows one
to determine which institutional investors monitor; the presence of institutional investors that
monitor is likely to strengthen the corporate governance of the investee firm. The rise in
corporate scandals and collapses globally has resulted in institutional investors in South Africa
adopting a more active approach in investee companies’ corporate governance matters which
is expected to provide an additional monitoring function (Bikha, 2014). The dividend decision
is therefore an instrument that this study uses to assess the monitoring abilities of institutional
investors in South Africa.
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1.1 Research Objectives and Contributions
This study investigates the effect of institutional investors on firm dividend policy in South
Africa, using data from all the firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the
period 2009 to 2018. The evidence from the panel data regression models show a positive but
statistically insignificant association between institutional investors and the firm dividend
policy in all the subcategories of institutions in this paper.
This paper contributes to literature in its examination of the effect of institutional investors on
dividend policy, it segregates the institutional investors into monitoring and non-monitoring
institutions; and as far this study is aware, no other study has segregated institutional investors
into subcategories in South Africa. The segregation of institutional investors is deemed to be
important as monitoring institutions play an active role in the corporate governance matters of
the investee firms.
The results from the panel data regression model find a positive but insignificant relation
between total/monitoring/non-monitoring institutional investors and the dividend pay-out
policy. That is, the results were insignificant for all the different categories of institutional
investors. This infers that there is no evidence to support that institutional investors affect or
cause an increase in the investee firm’s dividend policy in South Africa. These results do not
support the predictions and results of Short et al (2002:108), Firth et al. (2016) and, Huang and
Paul (2017), that state “that institutional investors will use dividends as a monitoring device,”
and thereby cause an increase in the dividend pay-out ratio. Further, given that the results were
insignificant across all three models, it means that there is no evidence to show that institutional
investors in South Africa are unique, which is inconsistent with existing theory (see, Bushee,
1998; Firth et al., 2016).
1.2 Research Outline
The structure of the study is as follows; section two analyses the relations between dividend
policy and institutional ownership in the context of existing theories and empirical evidence.
Section three of this paper provides the hypothesis that will be tested. Section four analyses the
research sample, variables and the empirical method to be used in determining the association
between dividends and institutional ownership. Section five and six provide the results and the
discussion of the empirical analysis. Lastly, section seven presents the conclusion of this
dissertation.
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Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter covers current knowledge and substantive findings of the relationship between
institutional investors and firm’s dividend policy.  It is divided into four sections: the first
section addresses the agency problems and dividends, the second section discusses monitoring
by institutional investors, the third section discusses the categories of institutional investors
and monitoring and lastly, the fourth section discusses institutional ownership and dividend
policy.
2.2 Agency problems and dividends
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain an agency relationship as an agreement under which one
or more principal(s) employ an agent to work on their behalf including giving the agent some
decision-making power. The disconnection of management and ownership in a company gives
rise to potential agency conflicts, where the managers may not act in the best interest of the
company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency costs are then defined as “the costs incurred
to monitor by the principal, the bonding costs by the agent, as well as the residual loss” ( Jensen
& Meckling, 1976:308).
Firms with a great amount of free cash flows are said to have an inclination to have high agency
costs (Jensen, 1986). The presence of free cash flow is inclined to incentivise management to
undertake unfavourable investments and thereby not act in the best interest of shareholders.
Reducing the discretionary funds available to managers has been proposed as one of the
processes that can be executed to decrease the agency costs (Jensen, 1986). Easterbrook (1984)
proposed that dividends may be functional in lowering the agency costs of management. The
declaration of dividends may send firms to the capital market, where managers are observed at
a reduced cost (Easterbrook, 1984). Returning excess cash to shareholders reduces the
likelihood that funds will be divested to unprofitable investments, thereby reducing agency
costs (Jensen, 1986).
Consequently, Rozeff (1982) justifies an optimal dividend pay-out model which engages two
market imperfections; being the costs incurred in issuing external finance, as well as the agency
costs of external finance.  Rozeff (1982:258) argues that “increasing dividends relative to
earnings lowers agency costs but raises the transaction costs of external financing and the sum
of these two opposing costs is said to determine an optimal dividend pay-out.”
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Mahmoud et al. (1995) conducted a study to investigate the agency/transaction cost argument
set forth by Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) to test a model of optimal dividend pay-out.
They conducted the study using 341 firms reported in the COMPUSTAT Industrial File over
the period 1972-1989 (Moh’d, Perry & Rimbey, 1995). By employing a time-series cross-
sectional regression analysis, they found a firm’s dividend policy was established to be
impacted by the size of the firm, the rate in which the firm grows by, the financial/operating
leverage mix of the firm, the business risks that are inherent to the firm as well as its ownership
structure (Moh’d, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995). They established that “firms do act to minimize the
sum [aggregate] of agency costs and the transaction costs towards a favourable level of
dividend pay-out” (Moh’d, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995:368). Firms are said to adjust their pay-out
to be in alignment with the movement in the agency/transaction cost composition, to a
favourable level (Moh’d, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995). Pertinent to the research done in this
dissertation, they observed firms to establish higher dividend pay-outs as institutional
ownership increases (Moh’d, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995).
Mollah et al. (2011) furthermore tested the impact of agency costs on dividend policy in
Bangladesh an emerging market post the financial crisis in the Bangladesh Stock Market 1997-
1998, as major changes in institutional settings, regulatory framework and trading activities
were put in place. The empirical results generated definitive evidence that agency costs and
transaction costs impact firm dividend policy in the pre and post- reform sample (Mollah,
2011).
The theoretical framework and empirical evidence discussed above contributes towards the
research done in this dissertation by establishing the theory that suggest that dividends can be
used to mitigate agency problems that exist in firms and further that the dividend policy of
companies is impacted by the firm’s ownership structure among other things mentioned above.
Further the research done in this dissertation will extend the sample to companies in different
industries listed in the JSE, and not just industrial firms which was the focus of Mahmoud et al
(1995) research. The research conducted by Mollah et al (2011) likewise contributes to the
research done in this dissertation as it ascertains that agency problems exist in emerging
markets and can be reduced by the declaration of dividends. The theories discussed above set
a great foundation for the research done in this dissertation, however we are yet to explore how
ownership structure impacts the dividend decision, essentially which owners have the powers
and incentive to convince management to declare dividends and use that as a tool to mitigate
agency costs.
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2.3 Monitoring by institutional owners
Jensen (1986) proposes that companies would be more inclined to pay out their free cash flow,
thereby reduce their agency costs, if monitoring levels were increased. Chen et al (2007:282)
states that “monitoring is the process of information gathering and efforts to influence
management, which is distinguished from trading by both the type of information gathered
(long term versus short term) and the effort to influence management rather than to simply
trade on that information”. The benefits of monitoring are the prospects of the resulting
financial gain from executing such influence and better information, for example as noted by
Jensen (1986), monitoring companies by ensuring that they declare excess cash as dividends
reduces the likelihood that funds will be divested into unprofitable investments which results
in an increase in shareholder wealth.
Evaluating the firm’s financial wellbeing and the corporate governance of the firm forms part
of institutional investors’ professional experiences and expertise, which puts them in a more
competent level to be able to monitor management (Crane, Michenaud, & Weston, 2016). Their
large stock positions enable them to reduce collaboration costs, generate economies of scale in
monitoring technologies and give them easier access to management and the board and thereby
enhances their likelihood to monitor firms relative to individuals (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986;
Bushee, 1998; Carleton et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2007). Further, institutions that have held the
shares in a firm for long periods of time are better positioned to process new information about
the firm, as they already have good grasp of the existing information of the firm, resulting in
lower monitoring costs (Chen et al., 2007).
Consequently, all companies encounter a benefit-cost analysis when deciding between
monitoring and trading in their investee firm, and based on the result of their analysis, some
may choose to monitor and play an active role in the corporate governance of the firm, while
others may merely decide to trade (Chen et al., 2007). As a result, Nagel et al (2005:350) argues
that “institutional investors tend to actively monitor only the firms that form a significant
percentage of their portfolio, where their reward for monitoring is the greatest”.
2.3.1 Empirical Review
Hatzell and Starks (2003), Aggarwal et al (2011) and Kim et al (2019) found evidence that
suggest that institutional investors actively monitor and impact the corporate governance of
their investee firms. Their research questions were different; however, the conclusions of their
major findings were the same; being that institutional investors monitor firms to reduce the
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agency problems between shareholders and managers. Hatzell and Starks (2003) analysed how
institutional investors impact the pay-for-performance of executive compensation, whereas
Aggarwal et al (2011) analysed whether institutional investors were more likely to terminate
poorly performing Chief Executive Officers and lastly, Kim et al (2019) analysed whether the
presence of institutional investors prompted firms to generate greater corporate innovation
outputs through the use of patents and patents citations.
Hatzell and Starks (2003) performed their analysis using 1914 firms included on the Standard
and Poor’s ExecuComp database from 1992 through 1997. They found that the assemblage of
institutional investor ownership was positively related to the performance sensitivity of
managerial compensation (Hatzell & Starks, 2003). Their results imply that institutional
investors impact executive pay and thereby support the theory that institutional investors play
a monitoring role (Hatzell & Starks, 2003
Kim et al (2019) conjectured that long-term institutional investors are crucial in stimulating
corporate innovation as they are inclined to resolve the problem of managerial short-termism
through their monitoring activities. The results of their analysis were consistent with their
hypothesis which further supports the notion that institutional investors play a crucial
monitoring role.
The empirical findings discussed above support the suggestions that the presence of
institutional investors increase monitoring levels as institutions are better equipped to be able
to monitor firms. These findings to an extent support Jensen’s (1986) proposal that to mitigate
agency costs, monitoring levels need to be enhanced, they do so by showing us that institutions
do monitor firms. It is therefore worth noting that though these findings suggest that
institutional investors monitor, they were not necessarily explicit as to how institutional
investors monitor which is the focal point of the research done in this dissertation. Further, the
results produced by Kim et al (2019) specifically stated it is long-term institutional investors
that monitor, which contributes to the research done in this paper as in the section below we
explore if whether all institutional investors monitor.
2.4 Categories of institutional ownership and monitoring
Bushee (1998) and Chen et al. (2007), among others, argue that analysing the effect of
institutions as a whole, suppresses the heterogeneity of institutions and assumes that they
behave in a uniform manner. As a result, they segregated institutional investors into categories
in their analyses and found that not all institutions monitor, rather it is institutions with certain
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traits that monitor and influence managers as they have more incentives to do so (Bushee, 1998;
Chen et al., 2007). Institutions will only monitor when the benefit of monitoring exceeds the
cost of monitoring (as mentioned in the subsections above), therefore certain characteristics of
institutions provide them with a greater incentive and prospects to monitor, as such the
influence of these traits can only be identified when institutions are segregated.
Bushee (1998) segregated the institutional investors into ‘dedicated institutions’, ‘quasi-
indexers institutions’ and ‘transient institutions’; whereas Chen et al. (2007) segregated them
into ‘grey institutions’ and ‘independent institutions.’
Transient institutions are those who hold small positions in multiple firms and trade often in
and out of stocks, generally “building their trades on a value proxy such as current earnings”
(Bushee, 1998:309). Their short-term focus makes them to be unlikely to dedicate to
monitoring. Quasi-indexers indexing or buy and hold strategies that are characterized by low
portfolio turnover and high diversification (Bushee, 1998). Quasi-indexers have very low
incentives to monitor managers due to their fractured ownership which allows them to gather
a limited amount of data on the business they invest in (Bushee, 1998). Dedicated institutions
on the other hand are characterized by having large and long-term holdings, which are
concentrated in a few firms, which provides incentives for them to monitor (Bushee,1998).
Grey institutions are those with business ties with firms and would rather shield existing and
latent business relations with companies than challenge management decisions as they could
lose current and possible business opportunities and it would cause harm to their relationships
with management (Chen et al., 2007). Independent institutions are those that do not search for
business relationships with companies that they invest in, and therefore when the benefits of
monitoring exceed the costs, have incentives to monitor (Chen et al., 2007).
2.4.1 Empirical Review
Chen et al (2007) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) found that it is independent institutional
investors that monitor firms as they do not have business ties with their investee firms and are
always therefore likely to be objective. Chang et al (2016) and Kim et al (2019) found that it is
long-term institutional investors that monitor firms as these institutions make long-term
portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gains. Whereas Firth’s et al (2016)
findings are a combination of the above, they found that independent institutions with a longer
investment focus and that have larger holdings are better positioned to monitor as they have a
greater exit threat.
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After segregating the institutional investors, Bushee (1998) found that transient institutional
investors are less likely to monitor, in fact a significant level of these type of institutions is
more likely to cause managers to be short-term orientated. This is because the short-term
orientated attitude of these investors puts pressure on management to sacrifice research and
development for the sake of higher current earnings (Bushee, 1998). In a similar vein, Firth et
al (2016) found that institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies and securities
companies are less likely to monitor as they have a lower exist threat, as they have business
relations with their investee firms which they are not willing to compromise.
Chen’s at el (2007) findings were observed when they conducted a study to determine which
institutional investors matter when it comes to monitoring. Using US mergers announced
between 1 January 1984 and 31 December 2001 they analysed the relationship between
institutional holding and acquisition quality to determine if whether they have any impact on
post-merger performance (Chen et al, 2007). They found that only concentrated holdings by
independent long-term institutional investors impact post-merger performance and further that
total institutional holdings and holdings by other types of institutions show no monitoring effect
(Chen et al, 2007).
Though the focus of the studies discussed above was not to answer the same research question
as this dissertation, their major findings (that certain institutional investors monitor) contribute
greatly to this dissertation as they provide an additional layer to the established foundation that
institutional investors monitor. This additional layer therefore ensures that this dissertation
does not just analyse the impact of institutional investors on dividend policy as a whole but
rather segregate the institutions into those that are likely to monitor and those that are predicted
to not be likely to monitor.
As the foundation has been laid in the discussions above, the remainder of this literature review
will focus on the interaction of institutional investors with dividend policy, which is the
research question of this dissertation.
2.5 Institutional ownership and dividend policy
This subsection addresses the interaction between institutional ownership and firm dividend
policy. It does so by discussing how institutional owners use dividends a monitoring device;
by discussing how differences in institutional framework and differential tax treatments impact
institutional investors preference for dividends, as well as discussing the established low-
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dividend preference puzzle of institutions and lastly discusses the institutional investors’ need
for funds on an ongoing basis which also impacts their interaction with firm dividend policy.
2.5.1 Dividends as a monitoring device
Adjusting firm dividend policy has been found to be the instrument through which institutional
investors execute their monitoring of firms (Firth et al, 2016; Chang et al, 2016; Kilincarslan
& Ozdemir, 2018); as it has been stated that the declaration of dividends reduces the amount
of discretionary funds available to management, thereby reducing the agency cost.
Hussain and Khan (2014), Firth et al (2016), Chang et al (2016) and Kilincarslan and Ozdemir
(2018) found a positive and significant relationship between a certain category of institutional
investors and the firm dividend policy. Chang et al (2016) found this positive relationship with
dividends to only be present in concentrated institutional investors with large stakes and long-
term investment horizons. Whereas Kilincarslan and Ozdemir (2018) found this positive effect
with just longer-term institutional investors, and they found a negative impact on dividends
corresponds with institutional investors with short-term investment. Similar with Chang et al
(2016), Firth et al (2016) found this positive relation to exist in long-term institutional
investors, however they found that the institutions also had to be independent of the
management of the firm to be able to influence objectively.
To study the relationship between institutional investors and dividend policy, Hussain and
Khan (2014) segregated the institutions as joint stock companies, foreign companies, insurance
companies, banks, modabaras and mutual funds. They used 104 firms listed on the Karachi
Stock Exchange for a period of eight years in their analysis. They employed a fixed effect
model of panel data regression and found the holdings of joint stock companies, foreign
companies and insurance companies have a positive and significant effect on dividend payment
because of their high concentration in Pakistani firms which gives them a good basis of
influence on decision making power of the firms’ managers (Hussain & Khan, 2014). Banks,
modabaras and mutual funds on the other hand were found to have no significant relationship
with dividend pay-out due to their lack of power to influence.
Firth’s et al (2016) study was conducted in China using firms listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003-2011. Using a fixed-effect panel data
regression model they investigated the effect of institutional investors on firm’s cash dividend
policy (Firth et al., 2016). They found mutual funds influence firms to declare higher cash
dividends, as these institutional investors are the most salient and powerful type in China; the
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results were more pronounced for firms with higher free cash flow (Firth et a., 2016). They had
hypothesized that mutual funds would have a positive and strong relationship with the firm’s
cash dividends because they have a greater exit threat, as they are independent of the firm and
have long-term and larger stakes; the results of their test were in line with their hypothesis as
already mentioned (Firth et al., 2016). On the other hand, they found banks, insurance
companies and securities company do not cause firms to pay more dividends, as they have a
lower exit threat (Firth et al., 2016).
In the context of the agency theory, Chang et al (2016) examined the effect of institutional
ownership on dividend pay-out using publicly traded U.S firms in the CRP and COMPUSTAT
data base between 1995-2009. They straight away conjectured that only institutional investors
with particular characteristics were likely to monitor firms (Chang et al.,2016). Also using a
fixed effect regression model, they found that long-term institutional investors with large stakes
cause firms to declare more dividends; their results were also more pronounced in firms with
high agency costs. The results of their test permitted them to conclude that long-term
institutions monitor firms, and they use dividends as the tool through which they execute their
monitoring (Chang et al., 2016).
Kilincarslan and Ozdemir (2018) on the other hand specifically looked at how the investment
horizon of institutional investors impact their relationship with firm dividend policy using non-
financial UK firms over the period 2000-2010. They used the churn rate of institutions’ overall
stock position to measure their investment horizons. They calculated quarterly churn rates for
each institutional investor to determine the frequency with which they rotate their positions on
all stocks of their portfolio (Kilincarslan & Ozdemir, 2018). Consistent with existing literature
they found that institutions with lower churn rates (longer term institutional investors) are more
concerned with monitoring, whereas institutions with higher churn rates (shorter term
investment horizon) have a negative impact on dividends (Kilincarslan & Ozdemir, 2018).
The existing literature that has been discussed above narrates the notion that only certain
institutional investors monitor firms. For institutions to be able to monitor they must be in a
position of power to be able to execute their monitoring; this evident as it is seen that the
institutional investors must have large stakes and must have a long-term investment horizon to
be able to influence management. This is apparent as Firth et al (2016) found mutual funds to
be the most powerful investors in China (therefore influence management) and insurance
companies to not be powerful; whereas Hussain and Khan (2014) found mutual funds to not be
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powerful in Pakistan but rather insurance companies to be the ones that influence management.
In addition to having the power to monitor, they must have the desire or incentive to monitor
in that they must be independent of the firm, which allows them to act objectively and not be
concerned about compromising business opportunities. All this evidence contributes greatly to
the research done in this dissertation as shows that the context in which the research is done
matters a lot; it allows one to be curious as to how institutional investors behave in a South
African context. This empirical evidence also contributes to the research done in this
dissertation as it guides one to know that institutional investors must be segregated to be able
to identify the true impact, that they exert on dividend policy. To the best of my knowledge,
the impact of institutional investors on dividend policy has not been analysed in the South
African context where institutions are segregated into the traits discussed in this literature
review.
2.5.2 Differences in institutional framework
Some authors such as Hofler et al. (2004) and Lahiri (2013) have argued that traditional agency
problems may be greatly reduced or do not exist in their countries, Germany and India
respectively, and therefore there is no incentives for institutional investors to use dividends as
a monitoring tool.
Hofler et al (2014) examined relationship between institutional ownership and dividend pay-
out behaviour of the firms in Germany given the fact that institutional frameworks and
ownership structures tend to vary around the world, using a sample which consisted of the
largest 100 firms across 28 industrial branches, mostly manufacturing, from 1970-1986.
The evidence they found showed that neither institutional ownership nor bank control is
statistically important in figuring out dividend pay-outs, meaning institutional ownership does
not lead to lower/higher dividend pay-outs in Germany (Hofler, Elston & Lee, 2004). This
insignificance of institutional control stems from the stylized facts regarding the unique
environment of German corporate governance (Hofler, Elston & Lee, 2004). They argued that
the traditional agency problems may be extensively reduced by the German commercial code
which “gives management the option to retain earnings of fifty percent or more of the firm’s
net income before any dividend decision or pay-out is made, which then reduces the scope of
the agency conflict over whether funds should be retained or declared a dividend, thereby
reducing the size of the funds in question” (Hofler, Elston & Lee, 2004:6).
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Lahiri (2013:450) also argued that “the well-protected rights of minority shareholders in India,
help Indian firms to distribute more dividends, hence, in India, dividend is neither used as a
means of monitoring activities of outside institutional investors or as a substitute mechanism
of monitoring activities.” Further, he argued that the traditional agency cost problem does not
exist in India (Lahiri, 2013).
The vast majority of the literature that has been covered proposes that institutional investors
use firm dividend policy to mitigate agency problems that exist between management and
shareholders. However, the evidence and arguments set forth under this subheading cautions
that the agency problem may not exist in every country as discussed above. This contributes
towards the research done in this dissertation as the research question looks for the impact of
institutional investors on dividend policy and this subsection then brings in the possibility that
there may no impact if the agency problem does not exist.
2.5.3 Differential tax treatment
Shareholders’ demand for dividends is often influenced by the differential tax treatment
between dividends tax and capital gains tax, as most investors are more concerned in after-tax
return on their investment (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010).This differential tax treatment may impact
the managers’ decision regarding the dispersal of dividends, when they answer to the
shareholders’ tax preference in order to make the most of shareholder wealth (Al-Malkawi et
al., 2010).
Dividends are taxed instantaneously, relative to taxes on capital gains that are only taxed when
the investment is sold (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010). Further, most countries tax dividends at a
relatively higher tax rate compared to capital gains, which positions investors that have a tax
advantage on capital gains to choose companies that reinvest their earnings instead of paying
them out as dividends (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010). As a result, based on different investors’
situation, taxes and transaction costs may cause investors to be attracted to firms that follow
dividend policies that best suit their situation (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010).
There are clear incentives for tax exempt institutions to demand high levels of dividends (Short
et al, 2002). As a result, Short et al. (2002) and Grinstein and Michaely (2005) found opposing
results of how institutional investors impact dividend policy due to the significant differences
in the outcomes of the tax systems in the United Kingdom and in the United States. The US
tax system is largely neutral in relation to dividend policy, whereas the UK tax system provides
clear incentives for tax-exempt institutions to demand dividends (Short et al., 2002).
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Short et al. (2002:109) state that “the US operates a classical company tax system whereby
companies are taxed separately from their shareholders; firms pay a flat rate on their profits
and shareholders pay income tax on the dividend income they receive at their marginal rates of
income.” As dividends are essentially taxed twice, the result is that basic and high rate income
taxpayers would choose profits to be kept in the firm instead of being paid out in dividends,
whereas shareholders who are exempt from tax would be neutral on the matter (Short et al.,
2002).
Whereas, the “UK operates a partial imputation company tax system whereby corporation tax
is charged on firm profits but part of that is considered when assessing shareholders’ liability
to income tax” (Short et al., 2002:109). This results in “tax-exempt shareholders to prefer
dividends to retentions, basic rate taxpayers being neutral with respect to dividends and
retention, and higher rate taxpayers prefer retention to dividends” (Short et al., 2002:107).
Given that “tax-exempt shareholders such as pension funds were the most influential investors
in many UK companies,” Short et al. (2002:107), using well-established dividend pay-out
models, found that a positive association exists between dividend pay-out policy and
institutional ownership (Short et al., 2002).
In contrast, Grinstein’s and Michaely’s (2005) results did not support models that predicted
that institutions cause firms to increase dividend pay-out. They found that though institutions
prefer firms that pay-out dividends, among those firms, they prefer firms that pay fewer
dividends (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005).  Despite a potentially larger tax advantage that
pension funds have, their results did not show that pension funds prefer high dividends
(Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). Their evidence rather indicate that institutional ownership is
higher for repurchasing firms and that changes in their repurchase policy cause institutional
holding to change in the same direction (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005).
In analysing the results of their investigation, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) initiate a strong
time trend in institutions’ partiality for dividend paying firms and repurchasing firms in the
Unites States. They found an important positive relationship between dividend levels and
institutional holdings between 1980 and 1984, which gradually became negative and from 1987
onward (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005).  Prior to the enactment of the SEC rule 10b-18 in the
mid-1980s, which allowed firms to repurchase their shares more freely, institutions as a whole,
preferred firms that paid more dividends (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). After the enactment of
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the SEC rule 10b-18, institutions partiality for dividends changed and showed an aversion to
high dividends and shifted towards preferring repurchases (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005).
Contrary to what Grinstein & Michaely (2005) found, using a Tobit analysis based on a
maximum likelihood estimation procedure, Han et al. (1999), empirically examined the
relationship between institutional ownership and dividend policy using a sample of 5500 firms
in the US, from 1988-1992. The results of their analysis showed “that dividends are positively
related to institutional ownership, therefore supporting the tax-based hypothesis,” suggesting a
certain type of dividend clientele (Han, Lee & Suk, 1999:53). Han et al. (1999) argues that
even after the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which decreased the exemption rate for dividends from
85 percent in 1986 to 70 percentage in 1988, institutional shareholders’ preference for
dividends still remained (Han, Lee & Suk, 1999).
Strickland (1996) also investigated whether the tax disadvantage of dividends results in a
relationship between institutional portfolio allocation and dividend yield. He analysed the
holdings of tax exempt and taxable institutions and found that taxable institutions prefer low
dividend yield stocks, while tax-exempt institutional investors do not exhibit a preference for
either high or low yield securities, after controlling for size, performance and risk (Strickland,
1996).
Amidu and Abor (2006) examined the determining factor of dividend pay-out ratios in Ghana,
they found a significantly positive relationship between cash flow and dividend pay-out ratio.
They also found a surprisingly positive relationship between corporate tax and dividend pay-
out ratio, meaning increasing tax is associated with an increase in dividend pay-out, which is
in contradiction with existing literature (Amidu & Abor, 2006).
 The empirical evidence analysed and discussed above clearly depict that evidence on whether
differential tax treatment causes institutional investors to impact firm dividend policy in favour
of their tax respective advantage has been mixed, the debate however is valid and strong as
some scholars have found this relationship to be significantly positive. Again, this contributes
to the research done in this dissertation as it opens a foundation to the possibility of institutional
investors impacting dividend policy in line with their respective tax position. The results of this
dissertation possibly will contribute to this unsettled relationship between institutional
investors and dividend policy in the lens of differential tax treatment, as South Africa has its
own unique tax laws from the above analysed countries.
2.5.4 Low-dividend preference puzzle
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In analysing institutional investors’ preference for dividends, Strickland (1996), Grinstein and
Michaely (2005) and Jacob and Lukose (2018:65) came across the “apparent low-dividend-
preference puzzle in which institutional investors have higher holdings in dividend-paying
firms, but among dividend payers, prefer firms that pay low dividends.” Grinstein and
Michaely obtained this observation when they were analysing US firms, whereas Jacob and
Lukose (2018) were analysing firms in India. As a result, they found no evidence to support
that the levels of dividends in firms were improved by the presence of institutional investors
(Grinstein & Michaely, 2005; Jacob & Lukose, 2018).
Huang and Paul (2017) examined the relationship between institutional investors and dividend
policy by jointly considering investment style and firms’ growth opportunities, to help resolve
the apparent low-dividend-preference puzzle. They classified institutional investors by growth
and value styles and sorted the firms by dividend levels and investment opportunities (Huang
& Paul, 2017). They documented that “growth style institutional investors have higher holdings
in firms with high investment opportunities, whereas value style institutional investors have
higher holdings in firms with low investment opportunities, an obvious first order effect”
(Huang & Paul, 2017:153). They stated that “when controlling for investment style,
institutional investors’ preference for dividends are based on whether pay-out levels are
consistent with firms’ needs to fund growth opportunities” (Huang & Paul, 2017:153). The
results of their regression analysis also found that “within the set of firms that match their style,
institutions prefer dividend policies aligned to their investment opportunities” (Huang & Paul,
2017:153).
Value style institutions have more holdings in value firms with high dividends, whereas growth
style institutions have more holdings in growth firms with low or no dividends (Huang & Paul,
2017). Huang and Paul (2017:157), show that “the understanding of the dividend and pay-out
preferences of institutions is incomplete without considering both investment opportunities and
institutional investor style.” They also found suggestive evidence that “available cash flow is
an important consideration for institutional investors when choosing firms based on the
interaction of their investment opportunities and pay-out policy” (Huang & Paul, 2017:157).
2.5.5 Institutional Investors’ need for funds
Short et al. (2002:108) argues that “a related issue is the need of institutional investors for funds
on an ongoing basis.” They argue “that institutions invest in equities in order to provide returns
to fund their activities, such as pension funds paying out cash in insurance policies” (Short et
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al., 2002:108). Further, irrespective of any tax induced biases, it is impractical for institutions
to depend on capital gains to service their liabilities, and hence, some level of dividend payment
is needed (Short et al., 2002). Even further, the actuarial value of pension funds is in part based
on dividend income (Short et al, 2002). And therefore, “these institutions’ requirements for
certain levels of dividends to meet their own liabilities may force companies to pay out
dividends at a higher level than they would otherwise prefer” (Short et al., 2002:108).
Gholamhossein (2012:339) found “that joint stock companies’ ownership, foreign companies’
ownership and insurance companies’ ownership have positive and significant effect on
dividend payment.” Institutional investors would rather have cash dividend in the place of
increasing their percentage shares in Pakistani firms because of the political instability and the
economic conditions. Insurance companies on the other hand prefer cash dividend as they must
settle their customer claims (Gholamhossein, 2012). Kilincarslan and Ozdemir (2018) also
found evidence that institutional investors influence dividend policy in line with their liquidity
needs.
The findings discussed above suggest that amidst a lot of reasons as to why some institutional
investors may want firms to declare their excess cash as dividends, it is their constant need for
cash, which obviously will not apply to all institutional investors. This contributes to the debate
as to how institutional investors interact with dividends which is the research question that this
dissertation is looking into. As it has been established and discussed in subsections above, not
all institutional investors may want firms to declare their cash as dividends, however those that
need cash on a constant basis are likely to be inclined to influence management to declare
dividends.
2.6 Summary and Conclusion
Chapter two of this dissertation analysed and discussed the various theories and empirical
evidence that has been established regarding the impact of institutional investors on dividend
policy around the world. The cornerstone of this relationship seems to lie in the institutional
investors’ desire to mitigate agency costs and therefore use dividends as the instrument through
which they execute their monitoring. There are also other established reasons as to why
institutional investors would want firms to declare dividends, such as their favourable tax
position when it comes to dividends and to meet their liquidity needs.
Literature investigating the effect of institutional investors on dividend policy reported mixed
results around the world. Some studies found positive and significant relations between
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institutional investors and dividend policies (see, Short et al., 2002; Firth et al., 2016; Chang et
al., 2016; Cao, 2017; Huang & Paul, 2017), while other studies found no evidence to support
positive relations between institutional ownership and dividend pay-out levels (see, Grinstein
& Michaely, 2005; Amidu & Abor, 2006; Azzam et al., 2010; Jacob & Lukose, 2018). Though
these studies focused on both developed and emerging markets, none of them focused on South
Africa, except for Abor and Fiador (2013). This dissertation contributes to literature in its
examination of the effect of institutional investors on dividend policy, it segregates the
institutional investors into monitoring and non-monitoring institutions; and as far I am aware,
no other study has segregated institutional investors into subcategories in South Africa.
3. Hypothesis statement
In light of the findings presented in the literature review, above, this paper will now seek to
test the hypothesis given below:
H0: Independent institutional investors have no effect on firm dividend policy.
H1: Independent institutional investors have a positive effect on firm dividend policy.
This hypothesis is drawn from the submissions made in the literature review; that not all
institutional investors monitor, but it those that have incentives to monitor that monitor
management. Being independent of the firm positions institutional investor to be objective and
therefore able to monitor management.
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4.  Data and Variables
4.1 Sample selection
To test the hypothesis of this study, this study used information from all the firms listed on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the period 2009 to 2018. This study used a period of
nine years this is consistent with the period covered by prior studies (see, Abor and
Fiador,2013; Lahiri, 2013; Cao et al, 2017). Extending the sample period to 2003 significantly
reduces the sample size, as many companies delisted during the period covering 2007-2009.
This study used Thomson Reuters’ institutional common stock holdings data for the
institutional ownership variables. The information includes precise institutions and individuals,
their relationship to the company, their holdings, and their most recent trades. Dividend and
other financial data are obtained from Bloomberg. Consistent with Grinstein and Michaely
(2005), Chang et al (2016), Firth et al (2016) and Huang and Paul (2017), the paper excluded
firms that are in the financial sector, because they are heavily regulated and their financial
ratios are not comparable with other industry sectors; firms that delisted during the sample
period and firms with missing data have also been removed, which is consistent with Chang et
al (2016). After imposing the above restrictions, the sample of this study contains 12 960 firm-
year observations from 144 firms over 2009-2018. The sample size of this study is greater than
the minimum requirement for a sample to possess statistical power, given that it is greater than
50 + 8m as proposed by Green (1991). The minimum sample size for this study should be 50
+ 8(8), which is 114 (Green, 1991).
Table 1 Panel Sample Selection Criteria (2009-2018)
4.2 Variables
4.2.1 Dependent Variable (s)
This study used the annual cash dividend over the book value of total assets (DIV/TA) of a
firm, to measure the amount of dividend payment, which is in line with the definition made by
Criteria Number of Companies
Initial sample 360
Less firms in the Financial sector 43
Less firms that delisted & firms with missing data 173
Total firm-year observations for analysis 144
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Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Huang and Paul (2017). The dividends are scaled with total
assets instead of stock price to warrant that disparities in price do not influence the results in
any manner (Jacob & Lukose, 2018). Other studies used pay-out ratio as a proxy for dividend
pay-out level, however such a measure can easily be influenced by accounting manipulations
(Jacob & Lukose, 2018).
4.2.2 Independent Variable (s)
Consistent with Thompson Reuters, this study defines “institutional investors as organizations
whose primary purpose is to invest their own assets or those entrusted to them by others,”
which include banks, employee pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and hedge
funds.
This study used one measure of institutional holdings and three categories of institutional
holdings. The first category is ownership by all institutions and then segregating institutional
investors into monitoring and non-monitoring institutions as defined by existing literature.
All institutional investors
Consistent with Firth et al (2016), all institutional ownership is the percentage of total
institutional holdings in relation to all the outstanding shares in a company.
Categorizing institutional investors
Using votes on management initiated anti-takeover amendments, Brickely et al. (1988), found
that only certain investors actively partake in the voting process and successfully oppose
management’s decisions. Their evidence suggests that “it is only institutions that are less
subject to management influence, such as mutual funds, foundations, and public-employee
pension funds that are more likely to oppose management than banks, insurance companies
and trusts, which frequently derive benefits from lines of business under management control”
(Brickely et al., 1988:270). This calls for the need to categorise institutional investors based on
their monitoring incentives. This study categorises them into two main groups, monitoring and
non-monitoring.
Monitoring Institutions
Consistent with Brickely et al. (1998), this study classifies investment companies (including
mutual funds), investment advisors and public pension funds as monitoring institutions because
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of their independence from management. They are less likely to have business relations with
investee firms which would impair their objectivity, hence their ability to monitor management.
Monitoring institutions is measured as the percentage of monitoring institutional holdings in
relation to all the outstanding shares in a company.
Non-monitoring Institutions
Consistent with Brickley et al. (1998), this study classifies non-monitoring institutions as
banks, trusts, insurance companies and corporate pension funds, due to their lack of
independence from management which disables them from monitoring management.
Non-monitoring institutions is measured as the percentage of non-monitoring institutional
holdings in relation to all the outstanding shares in a company.
4.2.3 Control Variable (s)
The dividend distribution decision is one which involves the “determination of which portion
of cash earnings should be retained in the firm for reinvestment and which funds should be
paid out to investors from either current or accumulated retained earnings” and is therefore
influenced by multiple factors (Kania, 2005:4); Factors such as financial limitations,
investment chances and choices, firm size, pressure from investors and regulatory regime
(Anjanthan, 2013).
Profitability
Profitability is expected to be inversely related to dividends, because as profitability increases,
earnings are channelled into reinvestment opportunities rather than into dividends, to increase
firm’s return on equity (Kania, 2005). Kania hypothesized that profitability will be negatively
related to firm dividend pay-out, and she found that profitability is significantly and negatively
related to dividend pay-out (Kania, 2005).
Sugiastuti et al. (2018) and Anjanthan (2013) also conducted research to establish whether a
relation exists between dividend pay-out and firm performance. By employing a multiple
regression analysis on listed hotels and restaurants companies in Sri Lanka, Anjanthan (2013)
found that dividend policy has a significant and positive impact on profitability (Anjanthan,
2013); Meaning that, an increase in a firm’s financial well-being tends to positively affect the
dividend pay-out levels of a firm (Anjanthan, 2013). Similarly, Sugiastuti et al. (2018)
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concluded that profitability is one of the factors that positively and significantly affect dividend
policy. These findings are however in contradiction with those of Kania (2005).
The return on asset ratio (ROA) is therefore used to control for firm profitability as it is a vital
determinant of pay-out policy (Fama & French, 2001; Jacob & Lukose, 2018).
Sales growth
“Higher growth or abundant investment opportunities are suggested to induce lower cash
dividends as earnings are retained to finance the growth, by the pecking order theory” (Firth et
al., 2016:97). However, the impact of growth and market-to-book ratio on dividend policy are
equivocal, given that the substitute theory suggests that “firms with better growth prospects
want to establish a good reputation in the eyes of capital providers through paying out more
cash dividends” (Firth et al, 2016:97).
Kania (2005), also hypothesized that sales growth will be negatively related to dividend policy.
She further argued that firms with high growth opportunities should pay smaller dividends as
earnings are reinvested to fuel growth (Kania, 2005). Her results were consistent with her
hypothesis (Kania, 2005).
The sales growth (previous year’s) (growth) is used to control for expected growth and future
investment opportunities (Jacob & Lukose, 2018).
Market-to-book ratio
In investigating the determinants of dividend policy in Ghana, Amidu and Abor (2006) used
the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the firms’ prospects and investment opportunities. They
found that “the market-to-book ratio is significantly and negatively associated with dividend
pay-out, given that growing firms require more funds in order to finance their growth and
therefore would retain a greater proportion of their earnings by paying low dividends” (Amidu
& Abor, 2006: 142). Further, firms with high market-to-book ratio retain more of their funds
because they typically have good investment opportunities (Amidu & Abor, 2006).
As a result, the market-to-book ratio (MB) is used to control for expected growth and future
investment opportunities (Jacob & Lukose, 2018).
Financial Leverage
Kania (2005) hypothesized that financial leverage will be negatively related to dividend pay-
out, because as debt levels increase, a company is unlikely to pay dividends as it must contend
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to interest payments and debt covenants. However, financial leverage produced an unexpected
positive relation with dividend pay-out which is consistent with the findings of Sugiastuti et al.
(2018) (Kania, 2005).
Further, in terms of the pecking order hypothesis, greater incentives to retain accumulated
earnings and thereby pay lower dividends are allocated to firms with higher debt ratios (Jacob
& Lukose, 2018). Firth et al. (2016:97) also argues that “as debt and dividends might be used
to reduce cash flows, they could be substitutes in resolving agency problems.”
The debt ratio is used to measure leverage (Firth et al., 2016).
Firm Size
Redding (1997) established a model that forecasted that large firms are more relatively inclined
to pay cash dividends. The archetype is extracted from the narrative that institutional investors
for tax and fiduciary reasons, prefer companies that pay dividends and that markets are
imperfectly liquid. As a result, big investors choose to invest in big companies since it
decreases their business costs (Redding, 1997). Large corporations therefore respond to
institutional investors’ preference for dividends and declare more dividends relative to small
companies that are owned by individuals (Redding, 1997). The empirical evidence of the study,
therefore, indicates that firm size impacts the decision to pay dividends, as it shows that large
companies are more likely to declare dividends than small companies (Redding, 1997).
The logarithm of total sales is used to control for differences in firm size (Jacob & Lukose,
2018).
Firm Age
Existing literature shows that the age cycle of companies is one of the most important factors
companies consider when determining the method of dividend payment (Stepanyan, 2011).
Tamimi et al. (2014) therefore investigated the relationship between the age of a firm and its
dividend policy. They found a significantly positive relationship between the age of the
company and the dividend ratio (Tamimi et al., 2014).
The logarithm of firm age is incorporated in the test to control for differences in firm age (Jacob
& Lukose, 2018).
Market Risk
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Consistent with Chang et al (2016), this study controls for market risk using the standard
deviation of firms’ monthly stock return over the year.
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4.3 Table 2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study’s analysis. The full
sample contains 12 960 firm-year observations over the years 2009-2018. For the DIVTA
measure, the mean is 0.0244 and the median is 0.00986, meaning the data is skewed to the
right. This right skewness is confirmed by the maximum being 635% more than the median;
meaning that there are companies that pay very high dividends in the sample causing the
skewness.
The total institutional ownership measure has a mean value of 0.49 and a median of 0.45 which
also means that the total institutional ownership data is skewed to the right; the data for
monitoring institutions is also skewed to the right. This is expected given that the maximum of
both total institutional investors and monitoring institutional investors is 100%, meaning there
are high holdings that are skewing the mean to the right. The mean for non-monitoring
institutional investors is very low, at 1%, which shows that non-monitoring institutions hold
very small holdings.  Looking at the mean values of total institutional holdings (0.49) and
monitoring (0.48%), it appears that the majority of the institutions are monitoring institutions,
however they have very moderate holdings.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES N mean Median P25 P75 sd Min max
DIVTA 1296 0.0244 0.00986 0 0.0352 0.0396 0 0.399
TotalInst t-1 1296 0.49 0,45 0,09 0,88 0.3836 0 1
MonitoringINSTt-1 1296 0.48 0,435 0,09 0,87 0.3788 0 1
NonMonitoringInstt-1 1296 0.01 0 0 0,01 0.02436 0 0,32
LogSalest-1 1296 3.387 3.550 2.8874 4.0902 0.957 -1.218 5.307
SalesGrowtht-1 1296 34.61 8.167 0.0988 16.3561 697.8 -99.53 24,579
ROAt-1 1296 5.601 5.9595 2.0777 10.4652 14.73 -269.8 120.8
MBt-1 1296 3.883 1.4719 0.8879 2.6336 28.90 0.0215 736.4
Leveraget-1 1296 0.467 0.461 0.3308 0.5939 0.195 0 2.033
LogofAget-1 1296 1.552 1.556 1.3010 1.7993 0.317 0.602 2.223
Volt-1 1296 0.107 0.0794 0.0576 0.1150 0.160 0 4.222
Number of
Completed
144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
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4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Panel regression model
This section presents the results of how institutional ownership can influence companies’ cash
dividend pay-outs using the methodologies in Desai and Jin (2011) and Firth et al (2016). This
study investigates the impact of institutional ownership on the future dividend payments, by
regressing the measures of dividend policy on the one-year-lag values of institutional
ownership and another explanatory variable. Similarly, as Firth et al. (2016), this study used
firm-fixed effect models to control for the possible endogeneity coming from unobserved firm-
level, time-invariant factors that determine both dividend policy and institutional ownership at
the same time.
Consistent with Firth et al. (2016), the dividend policy of firm i in year t, measured by either
DIVi,t or DIVDMi,t, the regression model is as follows:
DIVi,t(DIVDMi,t) = α1,i + α2INSTi,t-1 + α3Controli,t-1 + Dummy(year) + εi,t                         (1)
DIVi,t(DIVDMi,t) = α1,i + α2 MonitoringINSTi,t-1 + α3Controli,t-1 + Dummy(year) + εi,t        (2)
DIVi,t(DIVDMi,t) = α1,i + α2 Non-MonitoringINSTi,t-1 + α3Controli,t-1 + Dummy(year) + εi,t  (3)
Where INSTi,t-1, MonitoringINSTi,t-1, Non-MonitoringINSTi,t-1, is the equity ownership of
all/monitoring/non-monitoring institutional investors in firm i in year t-1, respectively. Firm
specific control variables are discussed in the previous section. In line with Firth et al. (2016),
year dummies are added to capture possible year-specific effects and this study used
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered as the firm level. The root cause of the
unobserved heterogeneity could be due to differences in corporate governance policies,
managerial risk aversion or influences of the founding family on corporate policies, to name a
few (Jacob & Lukose, 2018).
Consistent with Grinstein and Michaely (2005), Firth et al. (2016) and Jacob and Lukose
(2018), this study used lagged ownership as institutional shareholders may take time to impact
managerial decision making, and therefore have a slower impact on dividend policy.
4.5 Univariate analysis
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In this study, a univariate analysis is conducted by comparing the mean and median of all the
variables included in the regression analysis of firms with and without institutional holdings.
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4.6 Table 3 Data analysis of all variables
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The analysis of correlation is a statistical technique “through which the order that a variable
can be related to another variable linearly can be measured” (Tamimi et al., 2014:58). The
relationship between the variables of this study has been presented in table 3. The correlation
coefficient between the independent variables applied in the analysis should not be large,
because the correlation between independent variables in a model can lead to the bias in the
regression results (Tamimi et al., 2014).
Multicollinearity is not a concern in this study’s analysis, as the correlation coefficients
between the independent and controlled variables within models is not greater than 70%

























DIVTA 0.16*** 0.04 1.00
Total_IN
ST 1.00*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 1.00
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5. Results analysis
5.1 Univariate analysis
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for firms without and with institutional ownership
Table 4 above presents the descriptive statistics for firms with high institutional ownership,
that is, those firms who have 5% or more of their equity held by institutional investors and for
firms with low institutional ownership, that is, those firms who do not have institutional
investors holding 5% or more of their equity, respectively. In a sample of 144 firms, 117 firms
have high institutional ownership and 27 firms have low institutional ownership.
The mean of the DIVDM variable for firms with high institutional ownership is 0.65, which is
higher than that of firms with low institutional ownership which is 0.46. This means that 65%
(a) Without institutional holding (b) With institutional holding
N Mean Median  N Mean Median
DIVTA 243 0.0165 0 1053 0.0264 0.01195
DIVDM 243 0.4606 0  1053 0.6548 1
LogSalest-1 243 2.3692 2.4254 1053 3.678 3.74773
SalesGrowt-1 243 16.913 6.8884 1053 39.0431 8.3310
ROAt-1 243 2.2803 4.1014 1053 6.4179 6.2141
MBt-1 243 9.8374 1.1778 1053 2.5327 1.5295
Leveraget-1 243 0.4307 0.4217 1053 0.4779 0.4685
LogofAget-1 243 1.4033 1.3802 1053 1.5909 1.6021
Volt-1 243 0.1754 0.1245  1053 1.5909 0.0725
Number compltd 27 27 27  117 117 117
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of the firms with high institutional ownership pay dividends compared to the 46% of firms with
low institutional ownership. That is, in a sample of 117 firms, which is the number of firms
with high institutional ownership, 77 of the firms pay dividends. Compared to only 13 of the
27 firms with low institutional ownership, paying dividends.
The mean of the DIVTA variable for firms with high institutional ownership is 0.02636 which
is 60% higher than that of firms with low institutional ownership, which is 0,0165. This means,
the value of dividends paid by firms with high institutional ownership is greater than that of
firms with low institutional ownership.
The mean of the LogSales variable for firms with high institutional ownership is 3.67781 which
is 55% higher than that of firms with low institutional ownership, which is 2,3692. That means,
institutional investors invest in large firms.
5.2 Hausman test analysis
Table 5 Hausman Test results
When examining “the effect of institutional ownership on dividend pay-outs, neglected
unobservable firm characteristics may lead to deceptive results due to endogeneity concerns”
(Chang et al., 2016: 25553). Given that “some firms may have founding chief executive officers
who are reluctant to pay dividends and this morale may then become a part of the corporate
culture” (Chang et al., 2016:2552). “We can consider the concern that neglected time-invariant
firm characteristics drive our results by controlling for firm-fixed effects in the regression
models” (Chang et al., 2016:2552).
A Hausman test is conducted, to see if the study should be running tests based on the fixed
effects model or random effects model, if random effect, the study would need to do a further
test based on the Breusch Pagan test to check if it should be a random or a pooled regression
model (Park, 2011). If the Hausman test recommends fixed effects model, then one does not
need to conduct a Breusch and Pagan test (Park, 2011).
Model χ2 Recommendation
TotalINSTt-1 99.90*** Fixed effects
MonitoringINSTt-1 99.66*** Fixed effects
Non_MonitoringInstt-1 106.3*** Fixed effects
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The tests for the three models separately showed that they should all be conducted based on
the fixed effects model, as the chi-square statistic from the Hausman test is highly significant,
in Table 5.
5.3 Effects of Institutional ownership on dividend policy
Table 6 Regression results
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3









LogSalest-1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ROA 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
SalesGrowth 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
MB 0.00005* 0.00005* 0.00005*
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)





LogofAge -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.047***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Constant 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.063***
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(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)










(df = 8; 1296)
8.812***
(df = 8; 1296)
8.581***
(df = 8; 1296)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.3.1 Total Institutional Investors
The panel data firm-fixed effects regression model results in Table 6 column 2 show that
ownership by all institutions is positively associated with the dividend pay-out ratio, though
not significantly. The direction of this relationship is consistent with past papers, because
existing theory states that institutional investors may be good monitors, given that they are
“professional investors with specialized expertise in evaluating firms’ financial performance,
management quality and governance” (Crane, Michenaud, & Weston, 2016:1378). The
relationship between institutional investors and dividend policy is expected to be positive,
given that institutions are likely to monitor and use dividends as a tool to mitigate firms’ agency
problems, as dividends are an effective and credible monitoring device. Short et al. (2002)
examined the link between dividend policy and institutional investors and did not segregate
them into different categories, their results produced positive and significant evidence that
institutions as a whole cause an increase in the dividend pay-out ratio of companies. Therefore,
these signs of the coefficients are consistent with those of Short et al. (2002), however they
were insignificant.
5.3.2 Monitoring Institutional Investors
The panel data firm-fixed effects regression model results in Table 6 column 3 shows that
ownership by monitoring institutions is positively associated with the dividend pay-out ratio,
though not significantly. Apart from them not being significant, these results are consistent
with the findings of Firth et al. (2016) and Chang et al. (2016), as these studies segregated
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institutions into monitoring and non-monitoring institutions, and they found a positive and
significant relationship between monitoring institutions and dividend policy. The relationship
between monitoring institutions and dividend policy is expected to be positive, given that active
and independent institutional investors are able to objectively govern managerial behaviours,
as they do not seek business relations with their investee firms (Firth et al., 2016).
5.3.3 Non-Monitoring Institutional Investors
The panel data firm-fixed effects regression model results in Table 6 column 3 show that
ownership by non-monitoring institutions is positively associated with the dividend pay-out
ratio, though not significant, which is consistent with the results of Firth et al. (2016). These
results are consistent with existing literature (see, Firth et al., 2016; Jacob & Lukose, 2018), as
grey institutions, being those that would rather protect existing and potential business
relationships with firms than challenge management decisions as that could damage their
relationship with management and lose existing and potential business opportunities, as defined
by Chen et al. (2007), were found to not have any significant influence on firms’ dividend
policy (Firth et al., 2016).
5.3.4 Control variables
The results of the controlled variables were consistent across all three categories of institutional
investors, in the three models that the study ran. The dividend pay-out ratio increases with
profitability, sales growth and market-to-book ratio and decreases with leverage, firm size, firm
age and market risk. This suggests that different firm characteristics impact the dividend pay-
out ratio differently (Chang et al. 2016).
The negative and significant coefficients on leverage are consistent with existing literatures’
predictions (see, Firth et al, 2016; Chang et al. 2016), and “reinforces the conclusions of Jensen
(1986), that leverage is a substitute for cash dividend in reducing agency costs” (Firth et al.,
2016:98). The coefficients on ROA are positive and statistically significant, which shows that
more profitable firms pay higher dividends, these results are consistent with existing literature
(see, Firth et al., 2016). The market-to-book ratio is positively and significantly associated with
the dividend pay-out ratio, which is inconsistent with existing literature (see, Huang & Paul,
2017), given that growing firms need more cash flow to be able to finance their expanding
operations, they would keep a large proportion of their earnings by paying few/little dividends
(Amidu & Abor, 2006). Firm age is negatively and significantly associated with the dividend
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pay-out ratio, which is inconsistent with Tamimi et al. (2014) whose results found a
significantly positive relationship between the age of the company and the dividend ratio.
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6. Robustness Check
Table 7
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3









































Observations 1296 1296 1296
Number of Completed 144 144 144
R-squared 0.09743034
0.0981 0.09578650
Adjusted R-squared -0.02170254 -0.0209 -0.02366778
F test
15.4365***
(df = 8; 1144)
15.5617***
(df = 8; 1144)
15.13525***
(df = 8; 1144)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Given that the results in section five above were insignificant for the independent variables,
the study then performed a robustness test where it winsorised all of the ownership and control
variables at the 1% and 99% levels to alleviate the possible effect of outliers, which is
consistent with Aggarwal et al (2011), Firth et al (2016), Chang et al (2016) and Kim et al
(2019).
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There are essentially three common ways of treating outliers; keeping the outlier and treating
it like any other data point, winsorize the data or eliminate the extremes from the sample
(Ghosh and Vigt, 2012). This study has opted to winsorize the data as mentioned above which
is consistent to the prior year studies identified. Winsorizing is the process of replacing any
data value above the 99% percentile by the 99% percentile and any value below the one
percentile with by the one percentile (Ghosh and Vigt, 2012). The benefit of this method is that
the sample size is not reduced.
The results of the regressions after winsorizing remained consistent with the main test in Table
6, except for Market-to-Book ratio which became more statistically significant after the
possible effects of the outliers were alleviated.
7. Conclusion
Even though the agency theory predicts that monitoring institutional investors will demand
higher dividend pay-outs, as dividends are an effective and reliable monitoring device,
empirical evidence for this expectation has been mixed. The lack of homogeneity in
institutional ownership may have driven these mixed results, given that different institutions
have different incentives and therefore their choice between monitoring and trading vary. This
study investigates the impact of total, monitoring and non-monitoring institutions on firm
dividend policy in South Africa from 2009 to 2018.  The results from the panel data regression
model find positive and insignificant relations between total/monitoring/non-monitoring
institutional investors and the dividend pay-out policy. These results do not support the
predictions and results of Short et al. (2002), Firth et al. (2016) and Huang and Paul (2017),
that institutional investors will use dividends as a monitoring device, and thereby cause an
increase in the dividend pay-out ratio. The insignificant results across all three models means
there is no evidence to show that institutional investors in South Africa are unique and that they
influence dividend policy of their investee firm.
The general implications of the results produced by this study are as follow: Even though it is
possible that firms pay dividends to reduce agency conflicts, there is no evidence that supports
that the portion of shares held by institutional investors are related to the dividend pay-out
policy. Secondly, although it is likely that institutions are more competent in monitoring
management actions than individuals, there is no evidence to show that they use dividends as
their monitoring device. The results of this study therefore caution those that invest in
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companies in South Africa and expect to receive more dividends by merely confirming the
presence of institutional investors in their potential investee company.
A potential reason as to why the findings in this paper are not consistent with prior year studies
is that institutional investors in South Africa only take an active monitoring role when
fundamental issues arise (Bhikha, 2014); this is mainly due to the existing structures that
encourage companies to adopt good corporate governance practises, such as the JSE listing
requirement, requiring listed entities to apply the King Code.
Future research could improve this study by increasing the sample size through the extension
of the sample period prior to 2009 to 2000, for example. This study could also be improved by
updating the proxies for the independent variables. This study could also be improved by
considering the share buy backs as an alternative for cash dividends.
To the best of my knowledge, this study produces the first results which analyse the impact of
different categories of institutional investors on dividend policy in South Africa, and therefore
highlight the importance of segregating institutional investors into subcategories when
analysing their effect, to determine whether they are homogenous or heterogenous.
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